NKOTB: Metacognitive Feelings

. Bence Nanay (University of Antwerp, Cambridge University)

ABSTRACT

How can we explain the phenomenology of a conscious thought? There seem to be two options: (a) it has propritary non-perceptual phenomenology and (b) its phenomenology can be explained in terms of perceptual phenomenology. The aim of this paper is to offer a third option in the cognitive phenomenology debate, which has not been explored: metacogntiive feelings. Metacognitive feelings are about (perceptual or nonperceptual) mental states but they are based on the vehicle and not the content properties of the first order mental state (e.g., the ease of processing). So a new way of thinking about the phenomenology of conscious thoughts would be that it derives from the metacognitive feelings that is about these thoughts - and this will be a kind of phenomenology that is neither perceptual nor cognitive.