Unconscious Qualities as the Basis of Content
Sam Coleman (University of Hertfordshire)

part of: Yet Another Workshop on Phenomenal Intentionality
November 30, 2014, 6:30am - 8:00am
Department of Philosophy, Central European University

Gellner Room
Nador utca 9
Budapest 1051

Go to conference's page


Katalin Farkas
Central European University
David Pitt
California State University, Los Angeles

Topic areas



I argue that (i) since there is unconscious mental content there must be unconscious qualia to carry that content, (ii) consciousness (i.e. subjective character, sheer awareness) has little or nothing do do with fixing content and (iii) unconscious non-mental qualities can be the basis also of natural intentionality. What emerges is a picture where proponents of phenomenal intentionality are right that qualia are key to content, but where traditional reductive naturalists are right that mental intentionality is just an offshoot of natural intentionality and that consciousness is a bystander.

Supporting material

Add supporting material (slides, programs, etc.)




Who is attending?

No one has said they will attend yet.

Will you attend this event?

Let us know so we can notify you of any change of plan.