The Authority of Our Self-ascription of “Mental States”: Experiential Dead-ends and Conceptual Cleared Ways

Hanoch Ben-Yami (Central European University)

Abstract

When we say, ‘I’d like to have a cup of coffee’, ‘I think Peter is in his room’ or ‘I have a headache’, then – assuming we are sincere, know the meaning of the words, and perhaps some other such caveats – what we say is true. The source of this authority has been a subject of philosophical theorising. One route that has been taken is to claim that when we experience something directly, when we are immediately conscious of it, we know its true nature; and that the content of our wishes and thoughts is also determined by their experiential nature. I think this is based on a wrong conception of our authority regarding how the things we see, hear, and so on appear to us. I shall first analyse the sources of this authority and then show why it cannot be used as a model for the explanation of our authority with respect to what we wish and think. I shall then develop a different explanation of this latter authority, one grounded in what is involved in the mastery or understanding of the relevant concepts.