Basic Social Cognition without Mindreading
Prof Dan Hutto (University of Wollongong)

May 28, 2015, 12:15pm - 2:15pm
Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne

G16 (Jim Potter Room)
Old Physics Building

Topic areas


Abstract: This paper argues that Mind-Reading Hypotheses (MRHs), of any kind, are not needed to explain basic social cognition. It reviews the two most popular MRHs: One-ToM and Two-ToM theories. These MRHs face competition in the form of Complementary Behaviour Reading Hypotheses (CBRHs). Following Buckner (2014), it is argued that the best strategy for putting CBRHs out of play is to appeal to need-based considerations about the psychosemantics of basic acts of social cognition. Against this backdrop a new competitor for MRHs is revealed: Mind Minding Hypothesis (MMHs) - these too are capable of explaining the known facts about basic forms of social cognition and also satisfy the teleological criterion. Objections concerning the theoretical tenability of MMHs are addressed.

Supporting material

Add supporting material (slides, programs, etc.)




Who is attending?

No one has said they will attend yet.

Will you attend this event?

Let us know so we can notify you of any change of plan.