John Locke and non-propositional knowledge
Peter Anstey (University of Sydney)

September 24, 2015, 4:15pm - 6:15pm
Department of Philosophy, University of Melbourne

G16 (Jim Potter Room)
Old Physics Building

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Abstract: This paper argues that John Locke held a four-step theory of the acquisition of knowledge. The first step involves the perception of the agreement or disagreement of ideas. It is argued that this step is pre-propositional and is a form of knowledge by acquaintance. The second step involves the formation of mental propositions. The third step involves the asserting or judging of mental propositions and the fourth step is the construction of verbal propositions. It is maintained, contrary to the views of Ruth Mattern, David Owen and others who hold that for Locke all knowledge is propositional, that this is the interpretation of best fit.

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