World in Mind
Room 243
Senate House Malet Street
London WC1E7HU
United Kingdom
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I will begin by sketching a view according to which perceptual phenomenal character is ‘extended’, in the sense of literally incorporating mind-independent entities in the subject’s environment (a view also known as Naive Realism or the Relational View). I will then argue that this metaphysical thesis about perceptual phenomenal character affords a novel version of epistemological disjunctivism, which is the view that a veridically perceiving subject is in a better epistemic position than a counterpart suffering an indistinguishable illusion or hallucination. I will conclude by comparing this view with other versions of epistemological disjunctivism, and I will suggest that the one I've offered comes as close as we possibly can to convincing the external world sceptic.
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