CFP: The Identity Theory of Truth Conference

Submission deadline: March 25, 2016

Conference date(s):
May 20, 2016 - May 21, 2016

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Conference Venue:

Faculty of Philosophy, Cambridge University
Cambridge, United Kingdom

Topic areas

Details

Call for papers

We invite submissions for papers to be presented at the forthcoming Identity Theory of Truth Conference, to be held in Cambridge on the 20th and 21st of May 2016. Submissions should take the form of a 500 word abstract. Submissions from under-represented groups in Philosophy are particularly encouraged.

Submissions on any aspect of the identity theory of truth are welcome. As a guide, the sorts of questions that may be addressed at this conference include:

- How exactly should the identity theory of truth be formulated?
- Why should we accept the identity theory? Is it a mere truism, is it supported by a desire to minimise our ontological commitments, or is it motivated in some other way, perhaps as a way to secure the idea that true thought ‘reaches right out to reality’?
- It is tempting to think that if the proposition that p is true, then it is true because p. Can this tempting thought be accommodated by the identity theory?
- Does the identity theory play a role in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus? If so, what are the implications for the interpretation of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy? And are there any lessons for contemporary philosophy here?
- To what extent, if at all, is the relationship between minimalism and the identity theory antagonistic?

Aims and Scope

The purpose of this conference is to bring together new research on the identity theory of truth. To a first approximation, the identity theory states that a proposition is true just in case it is identical with a fact. The identity theory is often seen as an alternative to both correspondence and minimalist theories of truth. The topic has many important connections to work in metaphysics, the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. And it plays an important role on in the history of philosophy: versions of the theory can be detected in the works of Bradley, Frege, Moore, Russell, and Wittgenstein, amongst others.

The conference is supported by the Faculty of Philosophy, Cambridge and the Mind Association. Inquiries should be directed to the conference organisers, Daniel Brigham and Robert Trueman, at the following address: identitytheoryoftruth2016 [@] gmail.com

Confirmed speakers:

Stewart Candlish

Julian Dodd

Pascal Engel

Jennifer Hornsby

Michael Potter

Gila Sher

Peter Sullivan

Submissions:

  • Contributions related to the identity theory of truth.
  • An abstract of no more than 500 words should be submitted electronically to identitytheoryoftruth2016 [@] gmail.com. Only one abstract per author may be submitted.
  • Deadline for submissions: 1200 GMT, 25th March 2016
  • Date of notification of acceptance: 1st of April 2016

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