Carnap’s Relativism

Vera Flocke (New York University)

Carnap (1956 [1950]) distinguishes between questions that are internal and questions that are external to a framework. He says that internal questions are either empirical or analytic (p. 214), while external questions are meaningless (p. 207). The question driving this essay is this: what kind of mistake is involved in external questions, so that they are meaningless?

I argue for a relativist interpretation of Carnap’s internal/external distinction. In this interpretation, Carnap thought that existence is relative to a framework, and that what exists varies between frameworks. Internal questions then are ones asking whether something exists relative to a specific framework. These relative questions, for Carnap, are meaningful. But external questions ask whether something exists, not relative to this or that framework, but absolutely speaking. These non-relative questions, for Carnap, are meaningless. Relativist interpretations contrast with language pluralist interpretations, according to which not what there is but only the meaning of ‘exists’ (and of related terms) varies between frameworks. 

My argument is this. Carnap introduced the internal/external distinction in order to provide a criterion for when empirically unverifiable existence claims are admissible. The internal/external distinction does provide such a criterion, however only assuming its relativist interpretation. This argument has consequences for the proper understanding of Carnap, and also for assessing Carnap’s legacy for contemporary metaontology.