Henry More Against Monopsychism

Chris Meyns (University of Cambridge), Chris Meyns

Abstract:

How many minds are there, and how are they distinct? In this paper I argue that Henry More (1614-1687) adopts a primitivism about psychic individuation. More resists monopsychism—the view that there is only a single mind in the universe—by showing how it leads to contradictions. He does not offer an alternative principle of the individuation of minds. I demonstrate how the recent proposal that More holds minds to be individuated by consciousness runs into textual and systematic problems. Instead of offering a novel principle, More does away with metaphysical principles of individuation for minds altogether. I show how More’s primitivism about psychic individuation signals a seventeenth century shift in approaches. Authors do not continue the existing individuation debate with new tools, but give up some of the assumptions that generated the puzzle in the first place.

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