Hybrid Theories in Meta-ethics

July 2, 2012 - July 4, 2012
Department of Philosophy, Mind & Cognition Research Cluster, University of Edinburgh

South Hall Complex
Pollock Halls
Edinburgh EH16 5
United Kingdom


  • AHRC
  • Analysis Trust
  • Mind Association
  • Scots Philosophical Association


Dorit Bar-On
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill
Stephen Barker
Nottingham University
Daniel Boisvert
University of North Carolina, Charlotte
University of North Carolina, Charlotte
Matthew Chrisman
University of Edinburgh
David Copp
University of California, Davis
University of Gothenburg
Steve Finlay
University of Southern California, Dana and David Dornsife College
Guy Fletcher
University of Edinburgh
Occidental College
Jennifer Hornsby
Birkbeck College, University of London
Mike Ridge
University of Edinburgh
Mark Schroeder
University of Southern California, Dana and David Dornsife College
Laura Schroeter
University of Melbourne
Francois Schroeter
University of Melbourne
Jon Tresan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill


Guy Fletcher
University of Edinburgh
Mike Ridge
University of Edinburgh

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A long-standing assumption in meta-ethics is that moral thought and language is either purely cognitive or purely non-cognitive. But this has recently been called into question. For whilst such pure theories seem to easily explain some elements of moral thought and language they seem to have a hard time explaining or accommodating others. This has led to the development of so-called hybrid theories, which take moral thought and language to combine cognitive and non-cognitive elements in some way. 

This conference brings together a large number of those presently working on hybrid theories to examine the prospects of these theories in meta-ethics, and the meta-normative more generally, and in other areas where similar theories have been proposed, such as pejorative terms. The wide range of issues that are discussed in connection with hybrid theories means that the conference will be of interest to anyone interested in meta-normativity in general, meta-ethics in particular, and philosophy of language.

When: July 2-4, 2012

Where: South Hall Complex, Pollock Halls, 18 Holyrood Park Road, Edinburgh

Provisional Titles:

Dorit Bar-On & Matthew Chrisman - TBC

Stephen Barker -  "What cannot be said must be passed over with expression: Is implicature what value-talk is all about?"    

Dan Boisvert - "Hybrid Expressivism, Success Condition Semantics, and Logic" 

David Copp - "Can a Hybrid Theory Have it Both Ways?"

John Eriksson - "Hybrid Expressivism: Content, Context and Convention"

Steve Finlay - "The Pragmatics of Normative Disagreement"

Guy Fletcher - "Are Moral Attitudes Conveyed by Implicature?"

Ryan Hay - "Hybrid Theories and Motivational Internalism"

Jennifer Hornsby - "Expletive Deleted" 

Mike Ridge - TBC

Mark Schroeder - "Tempered Expressivism"

Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter - "Why go Hybrid?"

Jon Tresan - "Hybrid Meaning or Ambiguity: The Moral of "Moral"



Guy Fletcher  - Guy.fletcher[at]ed.ac.uk

Mike Ridge - Mike.Ridge[at]ed.ac.uk

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June 1, 2012, 10:00am BST

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