Emotions, Psychology and Moral Judgments

Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in the origins and influences of moral intuitions and judgments. Multiple theories have been defended by philosophers and psychologists. Many of these theories call into question the reliability of our moral intuitions and the normative theories that are based on them. The aim of this conference is to explore these challenges and the possible links between moral psychology and normative ethics, as well as related issues in moral epistemology and metaphysics.

Friday, June 8. 10.00-16.30

Pauline Kleingeld (Groningen): The Significance of Empirical Psychology for Kantian Ethics
David Enoch (Hebrew University): A Defense of Moral Deference
Stephen Darwall (Yale): Reactive Attitudes and the Epistemology of Deontic Judgments

Saturday, June 9. 10.00-16.30

Antti Kauppinen (Trinity College Dublin): Scepticism About Moral Intuitions 
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (Duke): Is Morality Unified?
Bart Streumer (Reading): Can Moral Intuitions Refute the Error Theory?

Registration:

Attendance is free but please register by sending a message to
[email protected] with "Conference Emotions and Moral Judgments" as
the subject header.

The conference is organized by the NWO research project Good Guides or False Pilots? The Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment (Prof. Frans Jacobs, Dr. Antti Kauppinen, Dr. Thomas Nys, Dr. Laurens van Apeldoorn)