Intuitions and the Expertise Defense

September 13, 2017 - September 15, 2017
Centre for Science Studies, Department of Mathematics, Aarhus University

Nordre Ringgade 3

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  • Danish Council for Independent Research

Keynote speakers:

Joachim Horvath
University of Cologne
Sören Häggqvist
Stockholm University
Edouard Machery
University of Pittsburgh
University of Hong Kong
Jonathan Weinberg
University of Arizona


Samuel Schindler
University of Aarhus

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The use of intuitions as evidence in philosophical theorising has been intensely debated in recent years. In particular, experimental philosophers have criticised philosophers' reliance on intuitions as potentially biased and error-prone by showing that the folk's intuitions seem to vary from the philosophical consensus. 

Some philosophers have responded to this methodological challenge by appealing to the so-called ‘expertise defense’: philosophical experts—by virtue of their relevant training and skills—are more suited to judge the outcomes of thought experiments than laypeople. However, more recent studies suggest that even philosophers themselves may be subject to extraneous factors.

In this workshop we will discuss the latest developments regarding the expertise defense and experimentalists’ responses. Some of the questions we hope to elucidate are: What exactly does philosophical expertise consist of? Are philosophers expert intuiters? Can the expertise defense be sustained in the face of the recent findings concerning the experts?

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July 15, 2017, 9:00am CET

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