Mental Action & the Ontology of Mind

Mental Action & the Ontology of Mind 

The conference aims to explore new ways of understanding mental action and the relations between mental action and the metaphysics of mind, broadly construed. Particular focus shall be devoted to the question of whether mental action must be included among the fundamental ontological categories required for making sense of various mental phenomena, such as consciousness and intentionality. 

Questions to be discussed include: 

· What is the nature and scope of mental action?  How much of our mental lives is genuinely agential? 

· Can mental action be reduced to and explained in terms of non-agential mental states, processes, and events?

· Does mental action support non-reductionist and/or non-physicalist approaches to consciousness, intentionality, and other mental phenomena?

· Must mental action be included among the ontological categories required for making sense of the mind?

We are committed to implementing and maintaining the BPA and SWIP Good Practice Scheme

The support of the Institute of Philosophy, as well as the Department of Philosophy, Associate Provost of Research, and Rosenberry Fund at the University of Denver, are gratefully acknowledged