Material contribution, responsibility, and liability

Christian Barry (Australian National University)

Abstract

In her important recent work, Helen Frowe defends the view that
bystanders—those who do not pose threats to others—cannot be liable to
being harmed in self-defense or in defense of others. On her account,
harming bystanders always infringes their rights against being harmed,
since they have not acted in any way to forfeit them. According to
Frowe, harming bystanders can be justified only when it constitutes a
lesser evil.  Here I make the case that some bystanders can indeed be
liable to harm. They can be liable, I will argue, because they can be
morally responsible for threats of harm, and in becoming responsible
they can forfeit their rights. While bystanders do cannot be
responsible for initiating threats, they can become responsible for
the persistence for threats, and for culpably failing to prevent them
from being initiated in the first place.