Consciousness and Intentionality. Franz Brentano's Heritage in the Philosophy of Mind

February 7, 2013 - February 9, 2013
Fachbereich Philosophie, University of Salzburg

erzabt Klotz Straße 1/IV, Room 4.201 & 4.202
erzabt-Klotz-Straße 1
Salzburg 5020

View the Call For Papers


Mauro Antonelli
University of Milan - Bicocca
Wilhelm Baumgartner
University of Würzburg
Thomas Binder
University of Graz
Johannes L. Brandl
University of Salzburg
Arkadiusz Chrudzimski
University of Szczecin
Tim Crane
Cambridge University
Barry Dainton
University of Liverpool
Denis Fisette
University of Quebec at Montreal
University of Salzburg
Université de Genève
Robin Rollinger
University of Salzburg


University of Salzburg

Topic areas

Talks at this conference

Add a talk


The famous intentionality quote from Brentano’s Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint gave rise to many different glosses on how to understand what is meant by intentionality. Since Chisholm, Quine, and Davidson, the passage has often been referred to as making a claim about the irreducibility of the mental to the physical, turning Brentano’s thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental into a thesis about the peculiar idiom or vocabulary of the mental – a thesis about intensionality. However, in recent contributions to the philosophy of mind, the reception of Brentano’s philosophy of mind has departed to a large extent from this first reception of the intentionality thesis. Interestingly, his conception of intentionality and consciousness has been integrated into diverse and sometimes competing accounts of the mind:  higher-order theories of consciousness, self-representational accounts and varieties of representationalism and intentionalism often relate to Brentano’s conception of the mind. 

This conference will deal with these multiple intersections between Franz Brentano’s philosophy and the contemporary philosophy of mind, taking into consideration issues related – among others – to Brentano’s psychology, ontology, and theory of knowledge. Questions to be addressed may include – but are not limited to – phenomenal intentionality, internalism, non-conceptual content, disjunctivism, cognitive (and affective) phenomenology, self-awareness and time-consciousness. Contributions may take various angles: they may address for instance Brentano’s conception of the mental from a critical, historical and/or exegetical perspective, or they may propose original accounts of intentionality and consciousness inspired by – or critical of – Brentano’s insights on that matter.

Supporting material

Add supporting material (slides, programs, etc.)




February 1, 2013, 9:00am CET

Who is attending?

No one has said they will attend yet.

Will you attend this event?

Let us know so we can notify you of any change of plan.

RSVPing on PhilEvents is not sufficient to register for this event.

Custom tags:

#salzburg, #austria, #brentano