Epistemic Normativity: Its Shape And Nature

This workshop focuses on the following questions.

•   Do epistemological principles have normative implications and, if so, what is the source of their normativity?

•   Are all relevant epistemic principles unified by their common source?

•   Is epistemic normativity identified by what it is about, proper believing and proper belief-forming methods, or can other normative sources, like self-interest or morality, exert independent normative pressure on believing?

•   How does the right conception of epistemic normativity, whatever it is, fit into a general framework of normativity?

•   Is it true that belief or epistemic systems in general aim at truth and what role would this fact play in a conception of epistemic normativity?  

•   Do conceptions of epistemic normativity mirror the options we find in ethical theory so that we can distinguish virtue-based accounts from consequentialist and deontological approaches?

•   Does epistemology participate in other debates which have their original home in practical philosophy, like the question what role an agent’s perspective plays in deontic and evaluative notions, and are there pressures to provide unified answers to these questions?