Contemporary issues: Self-Knowledge

April 17, 2018
Department of Philosophy , Uppsala Universitet

Eng6-K1031
Humanistiskt centrum, hus 2, Thunbergsvägen 3H
Uppsala
Sweden

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Uppsala University

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The philosophy department at Uppsala University organizes a one-day workshop on self-knowledge, Tuesday April 17. The contemporary philosophical discussion about knowledge of one’s own mental states has branched out to nearby areas of the philosophy of language and mind, epistemology and theory of action in interesting and fruitful ways. This workshop covers some of the facets of the contemporary discussion: in what way is introspective knowledge of one’s own mental states tied to rationality? Is it a rational failure to be in a conscious mental state of a certain kind without having introspective knowledge that one is? What is the relation between de se knowledge of one’s own mental states, and non-de se knowledge of one’s own mental states? Can non-de se knowledge of mental states be just as important as de se knowledge of one’s own mental states is? How is introspective knowledge of mental states related to phenomena that are apparently closely connected to such knowledge, such as Moore’s paradox and the KK principle in epistemology?

Invited speakers: Aidan McGlynn (University of Edinburgh), Léa Salje (University of Leeds) & Daniel Stoljar (Australian National University).

Attendance is free of charge, but space is limited, so please contact the organizer if you are interested in attending!

Organizer: [email protected]

Where: Uppsala University, Engelska parken, Eng6-K1031

When: Tuesday, April 17, 10:15—16:45

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April 10, 2018, 8:00am CET

Who is attending?

3 people are attending:

University of Edinburgh
Carl Montan
(unaffiliated)
and 1 more.

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