CFP: Naturalism and Normativity in Hegel's Philosophy
Submission deadline: January 10, 2019
Topic areas
Details
Extended deadline:
The Editorial Board of Argumenta invites the submission of papers in answer to the following call:
Naturalism and Normativity in Hegel’s Philosophy
Guest Editor
Guido Seddone (University of Parma)
Invited contributors:
Antón Barba-Kay (The Catholic University of America, Washington D.C.)
David Ciavatta (Ryerson University, Toronto)
Katerina Deligiorgi (University of Essex)
Matthias Haase (The University of Chicago)
Elena Ficara (Universität Paderborn)
Dean Moyar (John Hopkins University, Baltimore)
Terry Pinkard (Georgetown University, Washington D.C.)
Clinton Tolley (UC San Diego)
For any query, please use the following address:
Deadline for submission: January 10th, 2019
Notification of acceptance: April 30th, 2019
Description
The aim of this special issue is to tackle Hegel’s approach to the constitution of the normative as outcome of natural premises and to investigate his novel version of naturalism. In the ambit of the American analytical philosophy, scholars like Sellars, Brandom and McDowell already pointed out that Hegel’s thought is based on the inferential analysis of the logical and pragmatic elements constituting mind, reason, self-consciousness and the normative. More recently authors like Pinkard, M. Thompson and Pippin have highlighted that Hegel’s philosophy leads to the investigation into the natural requisites and premises of the cognitive and intentional stances, pinpointing the ways in which a naturalistic method of scrutiny is in play.
Hegel’s naturalism is therefore an original version of naturalism enhancing our understanding of the cognitive, intentional and social human dispositions in light of their dependence on natural elements like life, desires, instincts and perception. The domain of the normative is instead constituted by means of the self-conscious life, namely the capacity to articulate concepts and to constitute a social dimension. Self-conscious life and the normative, namely the domain of freedom and autonomy, are not explained in Hegel’s thought as irreducible to and independent from nature understood as the domain of causality, but rather as elements proper to a natural substratum with which they establish a mutual dependence. The advantage of this approach is to explain these two domains as reciprocally dependent: self-conscious life does not originate in the separation from nature, but rather in establishing its own bonds with and dependence on nature.
This special issue intends to give an account of the naturalistic premises of normativity in order to extend our understanding of the philosophical category of naturalism and to enhance the comprehension of normativity from a naturalized perspective.
Contributions are welcome on topics including but not limited to the following:
Self-conscious life and normativity
Normativity and recognition
Free will
Continuity between life and mind
The constitution of self-consciousness from natural premises
The relation between the individual organism and its genus (Gattung)
The relation between the propositional content of the normative and the social interaction.
Does the notion of freedom belong to the normative or is it a regulative contentless notion?
Interdisciplinary aspects related to neuroscience, philosophy of biology and evolutionary psychology.
Articles must be written in English and should not exceed 8000 words. For the presentation of their articles, authors are requested to take into account the instructions available under Information for Authors. Submissions must be suitable for blind review. Each submission should also include a brief abstract of no more than 250 words and five keywords for indexing purposes. To submit a paper, please visit this page.
Notification of intent to submit, including both a title and a brief summary of the content, will be greatly appreciated, as it will assist with the coordination and planning of the special issue.
- This project has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation
programme under the Marie Sklodowska-Curie grant agreement No 704127 -