Is the Self Embodied?

The question this conference seeks to discuss is whether bodily awareness is rightly seen as a source of self-consciousness in the sense of consciousness of ourselves as subjects of experience and thought. Many thinkers working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind and cognitive science purport the view that the defining feature of the self is that it is embodied. We only need to think of the work of Zahavi and Gallagher, extended mind theories, ecological approaches to perception and enactive approaches to perception in psychology. Thinkers working in the tradition of Kant and German Idealism, in turn, claim the opposite and wish to affirm an intellectual conception of the self (e.g., Longuenesse, Alweiss). 

The purpose of this conference is to probe these views in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of how we should understand the self. Our keynote speakers represent various takes on this issue: Moran and Zahavi, proponents of embodiment from the phenomenological tradition and philosophy of mind; and Longuenesse and Alweiss, proponents of an intellectual account of the self from the Kantian tradition and phenomenology. We invite submissions that will contribute to the diversity of approaches to this topic. Submissions from the continental and analytic traditions, philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and other related areas are welcome.

Application Information:

The deadline for abstract submissions has closed. Successful applicants will be notified by the end of January 2020.

If you have any questions, please reach out to Samantha Fazekas at [email protected].