CFP: Is the Self Embodied?
Submission deadline: November 29, 2019
May 29, 2020 - May 30, 2020
Department of Philosophy, Trinity College Dublin
The question this conference seeks to discuss is whether bodily awareness is rightly seen as a source of self-consciousness in the sense of consciousness of ourselves as subjects of experience and thought. Many thinkers working in phenomenology, philosophy of mind and cognitive science purport the view that the defining feature of the self is that it is embodied. We only need to think of the work of Zahavi and Gallagher, extended mind theories, ecological approaches to perception and enactive approaches to perception in psychology. Thinkers working in the tradition of Kant and German Idealism, in turn, claim the opposite and wish to affirm an intellectual conception of the self (e.g., Longuenesse, Alweiss).
Our keynote speakers represent various takes on this issue: Zahavi, a proponent of embodiment from the phenomenological tradition; and Longuenesse and Alweiss, proponents of an intellectual account of the self from the Kantian tradition and phenomenology. The purpose of this conference is to probe these views in order to arrive at a deeper understanding of how we should understand the self.
In order to apply, please send a 500 word abstract prepared for anonymous review to Samantha Fazekas at firstname.lastname@example.org. Please include your details in the body of the email. The deadline for submissions is Friday, 29 November 2019. Successful applicants will be notified by Monday, 16 December 2019.
We will provide travel grants to two early career researchers (current Ph.D. students, recent Ph.D. recipients, or postdoctoral researchers) in order to alleviate travel costs associated with attending the conference. Please write a brief statement of 250 words explaining why you should be considered for a travel grant.
The conference is free of charge and open to the public. If you have any questions, please reach out to Samantha Fazekas at email@example.com.