A Pluralist Theory of Perception
Neil Mehta (Yale-NUS College)

March 4, 2021, 11:15am - 1:15pm
Philosophy, University of Melbourne

online seminar (see details under 'More information')
The university of Melbourne
Melbourne 3010


University of Melbourne

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Abstract: Philosophers of perception usually assume that monism is true – that there is a unitary philosophical account of what it is for me to perceive, say, a scarlet bell pepper. Here I begin to defend a contrasting pluralist theory of perception, which says that my perception essentially involves two radically different kinds of awareness that are exercised in concert. First, I deploy a successful sensory representation of the bell pepper and some of its property-instances. This explains various differences between perception and hallucination. Second, I am deeply aware of certain universals, in a way that reveals part – but not all – of their essences. This explains various similarities between perception and hallucination.

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Institute of Philosophy and Psychology “Constantin Rădulescu-Motru” of The Romanian Academy
La Trobe University

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