A Pluralist Theory of Perception

Neil Mehta (Yale-NUS College)

https://unimelb.zoom.us/j/82923371028?pwd=QTFsQjVRUjVvOG1RMHFFeUwvNm9XQT09

    Password: 361789

Abstract: Philosophers of perception usually assume that monism is true – that there is a unitary philosophical account of what it is for me to perceive, say, a scarlet bell pepper. Here I begin to defend a contrasting pluralist theory of perception, which says that my perception essentially involves two radically different kinds of awareness that are exercised in concert. First, I deploy a successful sensory representation of the bell pepper and some of its property-instances. This explains various differences between perception and hallucination. Second, I am deeply aware of certain universals, in a way that reveals part – but not all – of their essences. This explains various similarities between perception and hallucination.