Identity in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science
Talks at this conferenceAdd a talk
Workshop: Identity in Metaphysics and Philosophy of Science
Sunday 6th June, online via videoconference
ALL TIMES ARE CENTRAL EUROPEAN TIME (CET).
9.00 Kathrin Koslicki (University of Neuchâtel): Artifacts and the Limits of Human Creative Intentions
10.15 James Ladyman (Bristol University): Identity, Intension and Isomorphism
11.30 Kai Wehmeier (University of California): Relational Identity: Lessons from Frege and Wittgenstein
12.30 Lunch break
14.00 Fabrice Correia (University of Geneva): Factual Identity vs Propositional Identity
15.15 Charlotte Werndl (University of Salzburg) Can Somebody Please Say What Gibbsian Statistical Mechanics Says?
16.30 Augustin Rayo (MIT)Transcendence and Triviality
Kai Wehmeier (University of California): Relational Identity: Lessons from Frege and Wittgenstein
After a brief review of several notions in the vicinity of identity, I will present a reconstruction of what I take to be the principal historical argument against the properly relational character of objectual identity and discuss several objections to it. I will then present Frege’s Begriffsschrift theory of identity, according to which identity is a relation between names, as a viable option, and sharpen it in the light of an objection based on the necessity of identity.
Fabrice Correia (University of Geneva): Factual Identity vs Propositional Identity
I will defend the logic of factual identity (aka factual equivalence) that I advocated in “On the Logic of Factual Equivalence” (Review of Symbolic Logic, 2016) against what seems to be a powerful objection. The objection, I will argue, probably rests on the failure to distinguish between factual identity and what I will call “propositional identity”.
Augustin Rayo (MIT): Transcendence and Triviality
Modal contingentists face a dilemma: there are two attractive principles ofwhich they can only accept one. In this paper I show that the most naturalway of resolving the dilemma leads to expressive limitations. I then develop analternative resolution. In addition to overcoming the expressive limitations, thealternative picture allows for an attractive account of arithmetic and for a styleof semantic theorizing that can be helpful to contingentists.
If you want to participate, please register by sending an e-mail with "Identity workshop: registration" in the subject line to Robert Michels: [email protected]
Organisers: Jonas Waechter and Robert Michels
Funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation.
Identity in Cognitive Science, Quantum Mechanics, and Metaphysics
Project nr. 185435, PI: Kevin Mulligan
June 4, 2021, 11:45pm CET