Knowing about Knowledge and Learning about Recollection in the Meno

Douglass Reed

In this paper, Doug investigates whether Socrates can coherently maintain that he knows that knowledge is different from true opinion along with some other epistemological commitments in the dialogue. He also considers how Meno’s epistemic condition might change based on the recollection demonstration and the other arguments Socrates presents to him.

At the meeting, Doug will give a short introduction to his paper and then we will turn to discussion. The discussion will presuppose that participants have read the paper in advance of the session. The paper and Zoom link will be distributed to participants via email in a couple weeks prior to the event.  To allow yourself time to complete the readings, please register at least 48 hours prior to the event.  


You can register for this and other events on our website at https://www.newenglandsymposiumonancientphilosophy.com/.