CFP: Topoi: Time and Time Experience
Submission deadline: August 31, 2013
Topoi: An international Review of Philosophy, is planning to devote a special issue on Time and Time Experience. The editors will be Giuliano Torrengo (University of Milan) and Roberto Ciuni (Bochum University).
The deadline for the initial submission is 31 August 2013. Accepted papers will be published in 2014. Formatting instructions for submissions can be found at: http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/11245; click “Instructions for Authors” on the right. All submissions for this issue should be made through Topoi Editorial Manager (http://www.editorialmanager.com/topo/default.asp), selecting “S.I.: Time and time experience (Torrengo/Ciuni)” as Article Type.
Confirmed invited authors: Peter Ludlow (Northwestern University, Chicago) Robin Le Poidevin (University of Leeds) Barry Dainton (University of Liverpool) Christoph Hoerl (University of Warwick)
At least since the beginning of philosophising in Western culture, the concept of time has baffled the human mind. This is not surprising, since temporal aspects seem to dwell reality as well as the core of our thought and language. Thus, the reflection on time finds its “natural” location in many different spheres (and possibly at their overlaps) such as metaphysics, phenomenology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and the study of perception and cognition. Many recent and influential contributions in analytic philosophy have focused on the question whether the temporal aspects of our experience reflect aspects of reality, or they are rather mere projections of some sort. Many features of our experience fall under such a “issue of realism”: the sense of passage, the perception of change, memory, expectation of future events and planning for actions, decisions, and timely behaviour, to name a few.
In this context, it is crucial to keep clear the distinction between the role of metaphysical enterprise and psychological enterprise (both broadly construed). On the one hand, if we claim that a certain temporal feature of our experience is not a genuine feature of reality – clearly, a metaphysical claim – we also need a psychological justification of why we ordinarily think of it as a part of reality. On the other hand, explanations of our experience of temporal reality depends on what we take temporal reality to be like. It seems thus that the answer to the question ‘what is time?’ and the answer to the question ‘how does our temporal cognition work?’ get support from each other. If this is the case, certain methodological questions become also crucial; in particular: how should we construe the distinction between genuine representations of reality and metaphysically misleading representations of reality? Are hard sciences playing a central role here? Or should we look rather at ordinary phenomenology? More generally, what criteria should we set for appraising the different realist and anti-realist options? The general aim of the volume is to shed some light on such an interplay between the analysis of the reality of time and the analysis of our experience of time, by presenting new positions on the market.