Kantian Ontological Pluralism without Transcendental IdealismKris McDaniel (Syracuse University, University of Notre Dame), Giovanni Merlo (University of Geneva)
via Giuseppe Buffi 13
Abstract: First, I will investigate whether a version of ontological pluralism that distinguishes between two modes of existence—empirical reality and transcendental reality—is aptly ascribed to Kant. I will argue that there are important similarities between Kant’s views and the views of some of his scholastic predecessors that provide some reason to think that it is. Second, although Kant holds that what is (merely) empirically real is in some way mind-dependent, I will argue that one can distinguish modes of existence in this way without embracing the claim that empirical reality is modally or essentially dependent on finite minds. Third, I investigate whether distinguishing between these two modes of existence suffices for satisfying the intuitions driving some of Kant’s foundational principles or appropriate analogues of them, even if (mere) empirical reality is not mind-dependent.
The Lugano Philosophy Colloquia are a series of events organized by: Master in Philosophy - USI; Ratio - Philosophical Association; Istitute of Philosophical Studies – USI
These are online events held on Zoom. Sometimes, we also stream them on the USI Master in Philosophy Facebook page.