CFP: Persons, Ethics and Society: Assessing Conventionalism about Personhood
Submission deadline: May 31, 2022
November 3, 2022 - November 4, 2022
Complutense University of Madrid
CALL FOR ABSTRACTS
Persons, Ethics and Society: Assessing Conventionalism about Personhood
International Online Conference
November 3 and 4, 2022
The debate on personal identity has traditionally been divided into two main camps. On the one hand, psychological accounts argue that we are essentially psychological beings. And thus, they claim that most problems related to personal identity should be addressed from that point of view. On the other hand, Animalists claim that we are essentially biological beings. Consequently, they attempt to address most problems related to personal identity from that angle. One of the most important disagreements between these two main contenders is, then, the question about what kind of beings we are essentially.
On the face of it, psychological accounts seem to be more suitable to address ethical issues related to personal identity, while Animalism seems to have the upper hand when metaphysical issues are at stake. It is far from obvious, though, whether ethical issues should take precedence over metaphysical issues, or vice versa; some even argue ethical and metaphysical questions of personal identity should be kept separate.
Given this stalemate, it seems worthwhile to address the merits of a growing alternative: Conventionalism about personhood. According to Conventionalism, persons are constituted by social convention—persons are what we collectively have needed them to be—and this is the key to account for both ethical and metaphysical challenges of personal identity. Conventionalism has been explicitly and forcefully defended over the last few years by Kristie Miller and David Braddon-Mitchell. At the same time, there is an important trend within narrative theories of personal identity to emphasize the social aspects of personal identity. Eric Olson calls this “social narrativism”. And Marya Schechtman has recently defended her “Person Life View”, which has some challenges and advantages similar to those associated with Conventionalism.
This conference intends to gather both defenders and critics of Conventionalism to further the discussion as to whether Conventionalism can be seen as a way out of the stalemate between psychological accounts and Animalism.
• Kristie Miller (University of Sydney) and David Braddon-Mitchell (University of Sydney)
• David Shoemaker (Cornell University) and Shaun Nichols (Cornell University)
• Marya Schechtman (University of Illinois Chicago)
• Eric Olson
• Simon Beck (University of the Western Cape)
Possible topics include, but are not limited to:
• How does Conventionalism’s conception of personhood relate to Locke’s classical definition?
• Is it defensible to claim that we are, essentially, social entities?
• Does Conventionalism threaten the metaphysical force of personhood?
• Can Conventionalism offer a plausible account of the persistence problem?
• Can Conventionalism help solve some of the diverse ethical questions of personhood regarding cultural relativism?
• How well does Conventionalism do in addressing bioethical problems related to personal identity?
• Does Conventionalism have any implications for the characterization question?
• Is Conventionalism about personhood compatible with narrative views of personal identity?
The conference will be held online. Invited speakers will have 45 minutes to present their papers, followed by 15 minutes for questions. Those interested in participating should send a 500-word abstract, including a short biography, to [email protected] and [email protected] by May 31, 2022. The conference will be in English and attendance is free.
A selection of the presenters at the conference may be invited to contribute their paper to an edited volume.
Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera (Complutense University of Madrid)
Nils-Frederic Wagner (University Medical Center of the Johannes Gutenberg-University Mainz)
This event is funded by the Spanish Government through the research project “Institution and Constitution of Individuality: Ontological, Social and Legal Aspects” (PID2020-117413GA-I00 / AEI / 10.13039/501100011033), and the Complutense University of Madrid.