Privacy, Knowledge, and Self-Presentation
Cameron McCulloch (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)

part of: 26th Annual Oxford Graduate Philosophy Conference
November 12, 2022, 2:45pm - 3:45pm
Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford

Lecture Room
Faculty of Philosophy
Oxford OX2 6GG
United Kingdom

This will be an accessible event, including organized related activities

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  • Aristotelian Society
  • Royal Institute of Philosophy
  • Analysis Trust
  • Faculty of Philosophy


Oxford University
Oxford University
Oxford University
Oxford University
Oxford University
Oxford University

Topic areas



Epistemologists and privacy theorists have (mostly) ignored each other. This paper argues that this is a mistake. Despite the centrality of epistemic concerns to discussions of privacy, almost no theorists frame their theories in epistemic terms. I argue for an account which does just that. First, I raise two prominent theories of privacy that reject epistemic framing and argue this is a mistake for a variety of reasons. I then offer an epistemic frame (a constraint) on one of these theories and present a larger theory—the Knowledge Account of Privacy—of which it is a part. I then respond to two objections, one of which comes from the small quarter of privacy theorists who do cast their theories in epistemic terms.

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