Privacy, Knowledge, and Self-PresentationCameron McCulloch (University of Michigan, Ann Arbor)
part of:
26th Annual Oxford Graduate Philosophy Conference
Lecture Room
Faculty of Philosophy
Oxford OX2 6GG
United Kingdom
Sponsor(s):
- Aristotelian Society
- Royal Institute of Philosophy
- Analysis Trust
- Faculty of Philosophy
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Abstract:
Epistemologists and privacy theorists have (mostly) ignored each other. This paper argues that this is a mistake. Despite the centrality of epistemic concerns to discussions of privacy, almost no theorists frame their theories in epistemic terms. I argue for an account which does just that. First, I raise two prominent theories of privacy that reject epistemic framing and argue this is a mistake for a variety of reasons. I then offer an epistemic frame (a constraint) on one of these theories and present a larger theory—the Knowledge Account of Privacy—of which it is a part. I then respond to two objections, one of which comes from the small quarter of privacy theorists who do cast their theories in epistemic terms.
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