Perception and Fundamental Reality

PERCEPTION AND FUNDAMENTAL REALITY

The debate between naïve realism and representationalism has been an ongoing issue in the philosophy of perception. A recent trend in it has been enumerating and assessing the various possible intermediary positions among both extremes. Another has been working out the lesser explored, naïve realist view in detail. Most recently, there has been an interest in the relation between naïve realism and fundamental metaphysics. One connection is through the hard problem of consciousness. Some have argued that naïve realism holds the promise to solve the problem. Another connection is through the various desiderata of the naïve realist view, which—some have argued—may require a revised materialist, or even an idealist, metaphysics.

Parallel to this development in philosophy of perception, there has been an explosion in non-standard metaphysical positions in the vicinity of neutral monism and idealism. Those have been targeted explicitly at either solving or dissolving the hard problem. Since each is supposed to have distinctive consequences for the nature of psychological states, it is also natural to ask what view of perception is suggested by a specific metaphysical framework.

The conference will bring together philosophers of perception and metaphysicians in an attempt to clarify the relation among perception and fundamental reality in both directions. Scholars interested in those questions are welcome to join us. To obtain the details of the online meeting, please email [email protected]

SCHEDULE 

DAY 1 (Oct. 29)

8:00 - 9:00 HUA Haiming (Sun Yat-sen): Epistemological Disjunctivism, Naive Realism, and Introspective Indistinguishability

9:05 - 10:25 Maarten Steenhagen (Uppsala): Last Words of a Decaying Idealism

10:30 - 11:30 TANG Refeng (Beijing Normal): Doxasticist Naïve Realism

11:30 - 12:05 Break

12:05 - 13:25 Philip Goff (Durham): Why Did Thick Content Evolve?

13:30 - 14:30 LUO Changjie (Tianjin Foreign Studies): Between Two Ways of Characterizing Hallucination

14:40 - 16:00 Heather Logue (Leeds): Inextricabilism and the Hard Problem of Consciousness

DAY 2 (Oct. 30)

8:00 - 9:00 Itay Shani (Sun Yat-sen): No Perception Without Reception: Exploring the Ground of the Given

9:05 - 10:25 Clare Maccumhaill (Durham): Telekinesis and Anscombe’s Philosophy of Action and Perception

10:30 - 11:30 Ivan Ivanov (Sun Yat-sen): Dual-aspect Relationalism

11:30 - 12:05 Break

12:05 - 13:25 Keith Allen (York): Seeing Places

13:25 - 14:30 Christopher Brown (Xiamen): What Does Russellian Physicalism Require?

14:40 - 16:00 Helen Yetter-Chappell (Miami): Get Acquainted with Naive Idealism