Frege lectures 2024: Reasons for Action

GOTTLOB FREGE LECTURES IN THEORETICAL PHILOSOPHY 2024: EMMA BORG (LONDON):  REASONS FOR ACTION

Do people generally do what they do for the reasons they have? A standard answer in philosophy – Common-sense or Folk Psychology – says yes. But recently the idea that people are generally rational, reasons-responsive creatures has come under significant pressure, for a range of empirical findings (often generated within social, comparative, and developmental psychology) seem to show that, on the contrary, people are often reasons-blind, behaving on the basis of gut-feels and intuitions, and subject to numerous biases and other reasoning flaws. However, although this empirical work is now extremely well-known (stretching beyond the ivory tower and into the public consciousness), I suggest that the precise problem for Common-sense Psychology remains unclear. For there are (at least) three different arguments that the empirical data could be used to support. In these lectures I clarify these three arguments and contend that, for each one, there are responses available to an advocate of the Common-sense view. My conclusion will be that the case against Common-sense Psychology can be rejected and that we should retain the idea that (typical adult human) action involves acting for reasons.