Attentional Templates, Mental Imagery, and Rigidity of Imaginative Content

Piotr Kozak (University of Warsaw)

I critically examine the relationship between attentional templates, mental imagery, and perceptual processes. I argue that perceptualism, according to which mental imagery is either a kind of perceptual state or a representation of a perceptual state, is false. I introduce the so-called Rigid Argument, which holds that the content of attentional templates and mental imagery is partly rigid, whereas perceptual content is not. I contend that imaginative content refers to the same imaginative objects across possible worlds, independent of actual perceptual input, while perceptual representations are context-dependent and non-rigid. This distinction challenges the core assumption of perceptualist accounts and suggests that attentional templates and mental imagery cannot be subsumed under perceptual theories.

Piotr Kozak