Semantic and Intentional Content
Prof. Tim Crane (Cambridge University)

part of: The Eighth Semantics and Philosophy in Europe Colloquium
September 18, 2015, 2:30pm - 3:30pm
Newnham College, University of Cambridge

Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge CB3 9DA
United Kingdom

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Minyao Huang
University of Cambridge
Kasia Jaszczolt
University of Cambridge
Luca Sbordone
University of Cambridge

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Standard accounts of the semantics of intentional state attributions typically treat such attributions as relating subjects of states to abstract entities of some kind (e.g. propositions, intensions etc.). Many philosophers have used such semantic models in their attempts to understand intentionality: intentional content is conceived of as semantic content. In this talk I will argue that this way of thinking about intentional content distorts phenomenology and makes intentional theories of consciousness hard to understand. I will sketch an alternative conception of intentional content that does not rely on the semantic model.

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