A map of the research on IiFSLuis Felipe Bartolo Alegre (Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos)
Inconsistency in Factual Science
R. Riachuelo, 303
Rio de Janeiro
Studies on inconsistency in factual science can be divided according to a classification of inconsistencies advanced by , [1, pp.95–96] and [4, p.144].
Factual: Inconsistencies between a theory and data or observation; i.e. “mean beliefs, opinions, theories that are held to be true even though there are facts which contradict them” [3, p.488].
External: Inconsistencies between theories that describe the same system and that “attribute different natures to the same thing or arrive at different conclusions about it” [3, p.484].
Internal: That characterize those theories that imply contradictory statements.
Traditional epistemologists have always regarded any of these types of inconsistency as problematic, which made them hold the following theses:
• If a theory is inconsistency with data, the it’s false.
• If two theories contradict each other, at least one of them is false.
• An internally inconsistent theory is trivial and, hence, useless.
Davey  calls counter-tradition to the programme – often associated to paraconsistent logic – that dispute these theses. In this lecture I present a review of the most important studies on inconsistency in factual science by traditional and counter-traditional epistemologists. The lecture will be divided in three sections corresponding (mainly) to the previous classification of inconsistencies.
 T. Bartelborth, “Kann es rational sein, eine inkonsistente Theorie zu akzeptieren?”, Philosophia Naturalis, 26 (1989), pp.91–120.
 K. Davey, “Can good science be logically inconsistent?”, Synthese, 191(13) (2014), pp.3009–3026.
 R. Gotesky, “The uses of Inconsistency”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 28(4) (1968), pp.471–500.
 G. Priest, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Clarendon Press, 2006.
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