Inconsistency in Factual Science
Institute of Philosophy of the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
Rio de Janeiro
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Traditional epistemology has always rejected inconsistency on the grounds of the ex contradictione quodlibet (ECQ) logical principle. Since by ECQ, any proposition would follow from a contradiction, an inconsistent science would be uninformative and useless. Paraconsistent logics, by restricting ECQ, make it possible that at least some inconsistent science be not useless in this sense. Moreover, scholars like da Costa and Priest have even defended the possibility of corroborating contradictory propositions about the world.
In this workshop we discuss the problem that inconsistency poses to factual/empirical science, and what would it mean to accept inconsistent science. This includes the three types of inconsistency advanced by Gotesky, Bartelborth and Priest: i.e. inconsistencies (i) between a theory and data, (ii) between two different theories, and (iii) internal to a theory.
The Inconsistency in Factual Science workshop is to be held at Creativity 2019: 1st World Congress of the Brazilian Academy of Philosophy in Honor of Newton da Costa 90th Birthday. The exact day of the workshop will be anonunced in the first week of November.
December 10, 2019, 4:00am BRT
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