Some Evidence for Physicalism about SensationsAndrew Melnyk (University of Missouri, Columbia)
The event will be held at 11 AM (Iran Daylight Time (GMT+4:30)).
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I will address the hardest case for physicalism: perceptual and bodily sensations with distinctive phenomenal characters that we are aware of through introspection. I will clarify that physicalism about sensations requires that sensations and their properties are one and the same as certain physical or functional state-types. Then I will argue that some evidence for these type-identity claims exists: the fact, discovered from numerous imaging studies, that having a particular kind of sensation with a particular phenomenal character requires—never in fact occurs without—being in a particular brain state. I will specify precisely how this fact supports physicalism over its dualist rivals.
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